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NONRESIDENT MOTORIST STATUTES AND NOTICE
REQUIREMENTS UNDER STANDARD POLICIES:
INSURERS' LIABILITY FOR DEFAULT
JUDGMENTS *
COMPENSATION of automobile accident victims has in all states been fostered
by nonresident motorist statutes.1 These statutes designate an official, usually
the secretary of state,2 as the out-of-state driver's agent for service of process ;3
they permit an injured party to institute suit in his local court 4 by serving the
agent with the summons and complaint.5 After the agent or the injured has
forwarded the summons and complaint to the driver by mail,0 the local court
has jurisdiction over the out-of-state driver :7 if the driver does not appear to
defend, he will be bound by a default judgment.8 The injured can thus attain
*Staples v. Southern Fire & Cas. Co., 289 S.W.2d 512 (Ky. 1956) ; Tennant v. Farm
Bureau Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 286 App. Div. 117, 141 N.Y.S.2d 449 (4th Dep't 1955).
1. See 27 CHi-KENT L. REV. 230, 231 (1949). See also statutes collected in Culp,
Process in Actions Against Non-Resident Motorists, 32 MICH. L. Rxv. 325 (1934). Ftr
general discussion of constitutional and other questions arising under these statutes see
Culp, Recent Developments in Actions Against Non-Resident Motorists, 37 MICH. L. Rv.
58 (1938) ; Scott, Jurisdiction over Non-Resident Motorists, 39 HARv. L. Rxv. 563 (1926).
2. Culp, Process in Actions Against Non-Resident Motorists, 32 Mica. L. REv. 325
n.54 (1934).
3. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (out-of-state driver is deemed to have ap-
pointed the state official). The courts have generally abandoned the original rationale of
the statutes: the fiction that the driver, by using the state's highways, consents to the ap-
pointment of an agent. Modern courts have reasoned that the right to appoint an agent for
the driver derives from the police power. See Martins v. Fishbach Trucking Co., 183 F.2d
53 (1st Cir. 1950) ; Hirsch v. Warren, 253 Ky. 62, 68 S.W.2d 767 (1934) ; State ex rel.
Rush v. Circuit Ct., 209 Wis. 246, 248, 244 N.W. 766, 767 (1932).
4. Scott, Jurisdiction over Non-Resident Motorists, 39 HARv. L. REv. 563 (1926) (dis-
cussing basis for local court's jurisdiction).
5. E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 188.030 (1953); 'Mo. REv. STAT. § 506.240 (1949); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:7-3 (Supp. 1955). See also statutes collected in Culp, Recent Develop-
ments in Actions Against Non-Resident Motorists, 37 MICH. L. REV. 58 (1938) (noting
minor variations in other states).
6. E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 188.030 (1953) (injured must furnish driver's address to
official, who forwards process to driver) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:7-3 (Supp. 1955) (official
forwards process to driver; no statutory provision as to responsibility for obtaining ad-
dress) ; N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFIc LAW § 52 (injured must forward to driver notice of
service of process).
7. Hirsch v. Warren, 253 Ky. 62, 68 S.W.2d 767 (1934) (court's jurisdiction is con-
stitutional, even though the driver did not actually receive notice). The local court obtains
jurisdiction, however, only when the statute is reasonably calculated to give the driver
actual notice; the statute may, for example, require the injured to furnish the driver's last
known address and impose on either the local official or the injured the duty to communi-
cate with the driver by mail or other means. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 20 (1928).
8. Cherry v. Hefferman, 132 Fla. 386, 182 So. 427 (1938) ; Schaaf v. Brown, 304 Ky.
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jurisdiction more quickly, and at less cost, than if he had to proceed in the
driver's home state.9 But the fact that a valid claim is brought to judgment
against the driver does not of itself guarantee compensation of valid claims;
usually the injured party's judgment can be satisfied only by the driver's in-
surer.
10
Two recent cases indicate that collection of default judgments is hindered by
a conflict between the notice provisions of the statutes and the notice provisions
of automobile insurance policies. Both Staples v. Southern Fire & Casualty
Co." and Tennant v. Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.'2 were
suits by an injured against a driver's insurer to collect a default judgment ob-
tained against the driver after statutory service of process. Neither insurance
company had received notice of an earlier default proceeding, 13 since nonresi-
dent motorist statutes provide only for mailing the summons and complaint to
the driver,' 4 and, as frequently happens, 15 the driver had not received them.
466, 200 S.W.2d 909 (1947) ; State ex rel. Charette v. District Ct., 107 Mont. 489, 86 P.2d
750 (1939) ; ef. Morris v. Argo-Collier Truck Line, 39 F. Supp. 602 (W.D. Ky. 1941).
The constitutionality of a default judgment when the driver has not actually received
notice was settled in the leading case of Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). The Court
held that actual receipt was immaterial as long as the statute establishes procedures reason-
ably designed to give actual notice and the procedures have been followed in good faith.
State constitutions have been similarly interpreted. See Culp, Process in Actions Against
Non-Residents, 32 Mica. L. REv. 325, 336 (1934).
9. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). Apart from the obvious time and expense
that ensues from compelling plaintiff and his witnesses to appear in another state, a special
difficulty faces the executor or administrator of an injured party's estate: he may be unable
to sue in a foreign state. Mansfield v. McFarland, 202 Pa. 173, 51 Atl. 763 (1902) ; Joy's
Ex'r v. Swanton Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 111 Vt. 106, 10 A.2d 216 (1940). In order to
bring suit in a foreign state, the executor or administrator often has to appoint an ancillary
representative in the foreign jurisdiction. ATKINSON, WILLS § 106 (1953). But see 3
BEALE, CoNFLicr OF LAws § 507.2 (1935) (discussing legislative inroads in more than half
the states). Rose, Foreign Enforcement of Actions for Wrongful Death, 33 MICH. L. REv.
545 (1935) (discussing the greater ease of bringing suit in these cases).
10. Compensation of automobile accident victims has depended upon insurance in about
59% of temporary disability cases, 75% of permanent disability cases, and 71% of fatality
cases. COMMITrEE TO STUDY CO1PENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS, REPORT TO THE
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARcH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 76-91 (1932) ;
ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, PUBLICATION 115, FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN MOTOR
VEHICLE ACCIDENTS 3 (1953).
The term "driver" will hereinafter be used to mean the insured.
11. 289 S.W.2d512 (Ky. 1956).
12. 286 App. Div. 117, 141 N.Y.S.2d 449 (4th Dep't 1955).
13. Both companies, however, knew of the accident. In Tennant the driver notified the
company of the accident the day it occurred. 286 App. Div. at 118, 141 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
In Staples the company also knew that plaintiff was pressing a claim. Plaintiff had in two
letters informed the driver that he intended to sue. Two months before filing suit plaintiff
received a reply from the company, requesting him to postpone litigation. 289 S.W.2d at
514.
14. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 506.240 (1,949) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:7-3 (Supp. 1955);
N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 52.
15. Staples v. Southern Fire & Cas. Co., 289 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Ky. 1956).
1956]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
In Staples the secretary of state had mailed the summons and complaint to the
driver's last known address, but the letter had been refused and returned ;l in
Tennant the driver's wife had accepted the letter but apparently failed to give
it to him.17 In each case the defendant insurer's contract with the driver con-
tained the widely used standard condition requiring the driver to forward im-
mediately "every demand, notice, summons or other process received by him
or his representative."' 18 In each case the company's argument was premised
on the fact that process had been received by the driver's representative, since
service of process had been sufficient to give jurisdiction over the driver. The
companies then insisted that, by failing to forward the summons and complaint
to the insurer, the driver had breached a condition precedent to the company's
liability for the default judgment.' 9
The Tennant court denied recovery because lack of notice of the earlier suit
had prejudiced the company. Insurance companies require timely notice of the
commencement of a suit in order to negotiate settlements, litigate genuine
issues of liability and damage, and defend against fraudulent claims.2 0 In view
of the importance of timely notice, the court reasoned that the driver's failure
to notify the company necessarily prejudiced it and was therefore a breach
which could not be excused. The court consequently held that, under the terms
of a standard policy, the company is not liable unless it receives notice of the
suit.
The Staples court, too, based its decision solely on interpretation of the
policy's notice provision; but by adopting a strict interpretation, it found that
the policy had not been breached at all, and held the company liable. The court
understood the policy to require the driver to forward the summons and com-
plaint only when the driver or his representative actually received them. The
court accordingly found that the driver was not in breach unless the summons
16. Id. at 514.
17. 286App. Div. at 119, 141 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
18. 289 S.W.2d at 514; 286 App. Div. at 118, 141 N.Y.S.2d at 451. The condition is
from the widely used National Standard Policy Provisions. See AMERICAN BAR Ass'N,
INSURANCE POLICY ANNOTATIONS 95 (1941); APPLEMAN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSUR-
ANCE 225 (1938) ; SAWYER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE v, 285, 295 (1936).
19. Except when modified by statute, any breach of the policy by the driver which
avoids the company's liability to the driver will also preclude recovery from the company
by the injured party. E.g., New Jersey Fidelity & Plate Glass Ins. Co. v. Love, 43 F.2d
82 (4th Cir. 1930) ; Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Colthurst, 36 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1929) ;
Potter v. Great Am. Indemnity Co., 316 Mass. 155, 55 N.E.2d 198 (1944) ; Gerka v. Fidelity
& Cas. Co., 251 N.Y. 51, 167 N.E. 169 (1929). For general discussion of the effect of a
defense against the driver in suits by third party beneficiaries of the policy see 4 CoaBIN,
CONTRACTS 807 (1951). See also Dodge, An Injured Party's Rights Under An Auto-
mobile Liability Policy, 38 IOWA L. Rav. 116, 120 (1952).
20. Leach v. Farmer's Automobile Interinsurance Exchange, 70 Idaho 156, 213 P.2d
920 (1950) ; Tennant v. Farm Bureau Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 286 App. Div. 117, 141,
N.Y.S.2d 449 (4th Dep't 1955) ; General Finance Co. v. Pennsylvania Threshermen &
Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 348 Pa. 358, 35 A.2d 409 (1944).
See note 35 infra.
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and complaint had been received by the driver's "representative." The court
then held that the term "representative" did not include the driver's statutory
agent for service of process, the secretary of state. Thus, under the Staples
interpretation, the standard policy does not condition the company's liability
upon receiving notice whenever process is served on the secretary of state, but
only upon receiving notice when the driver actually receives the process mailed
to himyi In interpreting the policy, the court ignored the prejudice that may
result from lack of notice. Instead, it reasoned that since insurance companies
presumably know that default judgments are often obtained without actual
service of process, the absence of an express disclaimer indicated that the com-
pany intended to assume the risk-a rigorous application of the rule that
policies should be strictly construed against the insurer.2 2
Neither case reaches an adequate solution to the conflict between the notice
provisions of the statutes and the standard policy provisions: Tennant, by
adopting a broad interpretation of the notice requirement of the policy, denies
recovery to an injured party who had followed a statutory procedure adopted
to promote recovery. This broad interpretation will leave unsatisfied many
judgments founded on valid claims. Staples promotes recovery, but imposes
liability which seems broader than the risk contemplated by the company. In-
surance companies may, of course, accept the risk imposed by Staples. But the
risk is greater than insurance companies should bear; for the opportunity to
defend is a valuable safeguard against excessive or fraudulent claims.23 Insur-
ance companies may consequently accept the suggestion of the Staples court
and insert an express disclaimer in the standard policy. If the disclaimer sur-
vived strict interpretation by the courts, it would be a bar to many valid claims.
On the other hand, the courts may, by very strict interpretation of a disclaimer,
bind the company when it has not intended to be bound. Liability thus based
on a strict interpretation of contract would, moreover, lead only to successive
modifications of the notice provisions, each modification increasing litigation, 24
thereby offsetting the savings of time and expenses effected by nonresident
motorist statutes.
The courts can attack the prejudice problem directly by opening the default
judgment. The court which entered the default judgment normally has power
21. The court recognized that the driver would also be in breach if process had been
received by an agent whom the driver himself had appointed. 289 S.W.2d at 514-15. The
distinction between this situation and the case of an agent appointed by operation of law
seems tenuous. The term "representative" used in insurance policies includes the driver's
administrator, Holt, Extension of Non-Resident Motorist Statutes to Non-Resident Per-
sonal Representatives, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 223 (1952) ; it therefore was not intended to be
limited to agents personally designated by the driver.
22. See, e.g., 3 CoRBiN, CoNTcrs § 559 (1950).
23. See, e.g., Leach v. Farmers' Automobile Interinsurance Exchange, 70 Idaho 156,
213 P.2d 920 (1950) ; Stacey v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 114 Ohio St. 633, 151 N.E. 718 (1926);
PATTIURSON, ESSENTIALS OF INsURANcE LAw 281-82 (1935).
24. See Kessler, Coatracts of Adhesion--Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 COLU m. L. REv. 629, 633 (1943) ; Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. Rav. 700, 702-03
(1939).
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to open it during the same term upon a showing of good cause.2 In addition
the court's power may extend beyond the term, either by statute20 or by
virtue of the court's inherent power to issue just orders.27 The courts have
broad discretion in determining whether a party has shown good cause for
opening a judgment ;28 it would not seem an abuse of discretion to permit a
trial on the merits when the omissions of the driver or the foibles of the con-
structive service procedures prevented the company from defending earlier.2 9
Opening the default judgment will not unduly burden the injured party. The
procedure suggested will first of all encourage him to notify the company him-
25. Barney v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 147 Neb. 375, 23 N.W.2d
335 (1946) ; Tims v. Holland Furnace Co., 152 Ohio St. 469, 90 N.E.2d 376 (1950) ; Cow-
den v. Little Rock Road Mach. Co., 263 P.2d 423 (Okla. 1953).
26. E.g., 22 MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27.1433 (1955) (motion to set judgment aside must
be made within one year after entry) ; N.J. REv. RuLEs 4:62-2 (1953) (court may grant
relief within one year for mistake or neglect and other enumerated reasons; at any time
for other reasons justifying relief) ; 1 OR. Ra,. STAT. § 18.160 (1953) (court has dis-
cretion to grant relief from judgment within one year after notice that judgment has been
entered, upon a showing of mistake, inadvertance, surprise or excusable neglect).
27. United States v. Jordan, 186 F.2d 803 (6th Cir. 1951) (judgment may be set aside
when enforcement would be unconscionable) ; Rome Sales & Serv. Station v. Finch, 120
Pa. Super. 402, 183 Atl. 54 (1936) (opening default judgment is a substitute for a bill in
equity to enjoin proceedings at law) ; Kelly v. Serviss, 114 Vt. 52, 39 A.2d 336 (1944)
(courts of general jurisdiction have inherent discretionary power to set aside default judg-
ments during or after term).
The judgment may also be opened outside of term when both parties consent. Reisman
v. Central Mfg. Dist. Bank, 316 Ill. App. 371, 45 N.E.2d 90 (1942); Slattery v. Uvalde
Rock Asphalt Co., 140 S.W.2d 987,992 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) (dictum) ; cf. Harrison v. Os-
born, 31 Okla. 103, 114 Pac. 331 (1911). Older cases, however, have held that consent alone
is not sufficient; the court must still have power to open the judgment. Mayor & Aldermen
v. Bullock, 6 Ark. 282 (1845) ; Anderson v. Thompson, 75 Tenn. 259 (1881) ; W. L. Moody
& Co. v. Freeman & Williams, 24 Okla. 701, 104 Pac. 30 (1.909).
28. Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Cummings, 38 N.J. Super. 1, 118 A.2d 80
(App. Div. 1955); Stein v. Greene, 178 Pa. Super. 464, 116 A.2d 308 (1955) ; see also
Levee Dist. No. 4. v. Small, 281 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1955) (appellate courts are less likely
to overrule an order opening a default judgment than an order denying a motion to open).
29. In the leading case of Yanuzzi v. United States Cas. Co., 19 N.J. 201, 1.15 A.2d 557
(1955), the insurer had received notice of suit through its agent, but the agent erroneously
forwarded the notice to another insurance company. The court recognized that, although
all conditions of the policy relating to notice had been performed, the insurer did not have
an effective opportunity to defend the suit. The court deemed this an adequate reason for
opening the default judgment obtained by the injured against the driver; it stated that
opening the judgment was necessary to prevent undue prejudice to the company. Since the
injured person failed to show that he would thereby be prejudiced, the court granted the
motion, made by the company in the name of the driver, to open the judgment and defend
the action.
The courts are more liberal in opening default judgments than in opening judgments
entered after trial on the merits. Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Cummings, supra
note 28; Thomson v. Goubert, 137 Cal. App. 2d 153,289 P.2d 887 (1955) ; Locke v. Peterson,
3 Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955).
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self when he brings suit against the driver ;30 for timely notice by the injured
will prevent a later claim that breach, or prejudice, warrants opening the default
judgment.31 Usually the injured can readily give the company timely notice. He
must of course learn the identity of the insurer. But the injured must nearly
always locate the insurer before a judgment can be satisfied; and, as a prac-
tical matter, the injured will usually want to know whether the driver is insured
before deciding to bring suit against him. Often the identity of the insurer can
be obtained from the driver at the scene of the accident, from the accident re-
port filed with the police, or from preliminary correspondence with the driver.
If suit is commenced before the information can be obtained, deposition proce-
dure will often be available.3 2 The injured himself will then be able to notify
the company of the suit and consent to its entering a late appearance for the
driver. But even if the victim does not learn the insurer's identity until after
judgment, the only burden upon the injured will be the presentation of proof
that would have been necessary had the company received timely notice from
the driver or his representative. 33
30. The injured not only could easily assume this task, but also is the party who benefits
most when the company receives timely notice. See New Jersey Fidelity & Plate Glass Ins.
Co. v. Love, 43 F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1930) ; Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Colthurst, 36 F.2d
559, 561-62 (9th Cir. 1929) ; cf. Culp, Process in Action Against Non-Resident Motorists, 32
MICH. L. REv. 325 n.80 (1934) (collecting statutes which place on the injured, rather than
a local official, responsibility for notifying the driver when process is served on the driver's
agent).
31. Royal Indemnity Co. v. Morris, 37 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1929) ; Slavens v. Standard
Ace. Ins. Co., 27 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1928) ; see McClellan v. Madonti, 313 Pa. 515, 169 Atl.
760 (1934).
The standard policy specifically allows notice to be given "by or on behalf of the in-
sured," which includes the injured. AmERICAN BAR AsS'N, INSURANCE PoLIcy ANNOTA-
rIONS 95 (1941); APPLEMAN, AuTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE 225 (1938); SAWYER,
AUTOMonoBin LIABILITY INsuRANcE 295 (1936).
32. Many state courts have statutory authority to order depositions requested by parties
to suits being litigated outside the state. If the driver refuses to answer, he may be punished
for contempt of the court that ordered the deposition. See UNIFoRm FOREIGN DEPOSITIO NS
ACT; Note, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 241, 250-51 (1947). See also International Standard Elec.
Corp. v. The Thetis, 132 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (insurance contract is within per-
missible scope of pre-trial discovery).
33. At the default proceeding, the injured usually is not required to introduce evidence
supporting his cause of action, since defendant's failure to answer admits the material
allegations of the complaint. E.g., Greene v. Greene, 76 Ga. App. 225, 45 So. 2d 713 (1947) ;
Putney v. Du Bois Co., 240 Mo. App. 1075, 226 S.W.2d 737 (1950). In a few jurisdictions,
however, the plaintiff must prove his cause of action. See A. J. Hodges Industries, Inc. v.
Fobbs, 39 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 1949) ; Gimbel Bros. v. Corcoran, 15 N.J. Misc. 538, 192
Atl. 715 (Sup. Ct. 1937) ; Leglar v. Pittsburgh C.C. & St. L. R.R., 284 Pa. 521, 131 Atl.
363 (1925).
Plaintiff must offer evidence to support his claim for damages when, as in tort actions,
the amount of damage is unliquidated. E.g., Thorpe v. National City Bank, 274 Fed. 200
(Sth Cir. 1921) ; Edelstein v. Hub Loan Co., 130 N.J.L. 511, 33 A.2d 829 (1943) ; O'Con-
nell v. Schumer, 266 App. Div. 138, 41 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1st Dep't 1943).
Insurance companies may seldom find it profitable to relitigate the question of damages
uffcrcd if courts in default proceedings exercise their power to appoint court experts.
Sees N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1956, p. 33, col. 5 (court appointed medical experts reduced
195(.]
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Opening the default judgment will adequately protect the insurance company.
The company's opportunity to defend of course comes later than it would have
if the company had received notice of the original summons and complaint;
during the delay witnesses may have become unavailable.34 But when, as in the
principal cases, the company knew of the accident, the opportunity to answer
the complaint and conduct the defense will place the company in the same posi-
tion it would have been in had it also known of the original suit.35
Thus the courts can resolve the conflict between the standard policy notice
provisions and the statutes by using existing procedural devices. A minority of
states hold the insurer liable, even though the driver has breached a condition
of the policy, unless it appears that the company was actually prejudiced by
the breach.36 In these states the courts may adopt the Tennant interpretation
of the policy and find breach; actual prejudice would then be a material issue.
If prejudice were found, the courts could then enter an interlocutory order
staying the action against the company until it has had a reasonable time to
exaggerated claims and promoted compromise in tort case). For general discussion of the
power to appoint court experts see Sink, The Unused Power of a Federal Judge to Call
His Own Expert Witness, 29 So. CALIF. L. Rav. 195, 206-08 (1956) ; UNIFORM EXPERT
TESTIMONY AcT § 1, 38 COLUm. L. REv. 369 (1938).
34. See Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fruin-Colnon Contracting Co., 32 F.2d 425, 433
(8th Cir. 1929) ; Stacey v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 114 Ohio St. 633, 151 N.E. 718 (1926);
Note, 64 YAix L.J. 1208, 1213 (1955).
35. If the accident is not reported, the possibility of prejudice to the insurance company
is greater. Thus policies generally require "prompt" or "immediate" notice, or "notice as
soon as practicable." The courts generally interpret these phrases to mean notice that is
"reasonable in the light of all the circumstances." E.g., Hendrix v. Employers Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co., 102 F. Supp. 31 (E.D.S.C. 1952); Gibson v. Colonial Ins. Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d
33, 206 P.2d 387 (1949) ; State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Cassinelli, 67 Nev. 227,
216 P.2d 606 (1950). But see Farm Bureau Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Manson, 94 N.H.
389, 54 A2d 580 (1947) ("as soon as practicable" may give insured greater latitude than
"immediately").
The company's liability is avoided by failure to report the accident. E.g., Standard Acc.
Ins. Co. v. Turgeon, 140 F.2d 94 (1st Cir. 1944) ; Stacey v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., supra note
34. But see Edwards v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 11 La. App. 176, 123 So. 162 (1929). Never-
theless, if it could be shown that no actual prejudice resulted, the same rationale for open-
ing a default judgment should apply. For examples of circumstances that have excused
the insured's delay in giving notice, see, e.g., Hendrix v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.,
supra (lack of knowledge that accident had occurred) ; Reid v. Monticello, 44 So. 2d 509
(La. App. 1950) (belief that policy did not cover accident) ; Munal Clinic v. Applegate,
273 S.W.2d 712 (Tenn. App. 1954) (reasonable belief that no liability would ensue). But
see State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Casinelli, supra (belief that policy had lapsed
is no excuse). Generally when the delay has been held excusable under the circumstances,
the courts have also found that the company was not prejudiced by the delay. See notes
36, 38 infra and accompanying text.
36. E.g., Gibson v. Colonial Ins. Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 33, 206 P.2d 387 (1949) (pre-
sumption of prejudice is rebuttable) ; Frank v. Nash, 166 Pa. Super. 476, 71 A.2d 835 (1950)
(company has burden of showing prejudice) ; Calhoun v. Western Cas. & Surety Co., 260
Wis. 34,49 N.W.2d 911 (1951) (statute places burden of showing no prejudice on injured).
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move to reopen the default judgment. 7 If the company fails to take appropriate
steps to open the default judgment, it should not be allowed to set up the de-
fense of prejudice by lack of notice. The majority of states, however, bar
recovery whenever the policy has been breached, regardless of whether the
company has actually been prejudiced. 38 These states can also resolve the con-
flicting interests under existing procedures: they could adopt the Staples inter-
pretation of the policy and find no breach; they could then suspend judgment
for the injured party until the company is able to open the default judgment.
In any event, these states should not bar recovery if an opportunity to open
the default judgment is present. In view of the adequate protection this oppor-
tunity affords the insurer, and of the policy underlying the nonresident
motorist statutes of compensating automobile accident victims, courts should
grant recovery whenever breach has not caused actual prejudice. And, since
insurance companies may ultimately preclude the Staples result by more care-
ful drafting, the better method of granting recovery is to follow the minority
view and the Tennant interpretation.
37. The courts always have discretion to stay an action, pending the determination of
other litigation. See cases collected in Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949).
38. E.g., Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Turgeon, 140 F.2d 94 (1st Cir. 1944) ; State Farm
Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Cassinelli, 67 Nev. 227, 216 P.2d 606 (1950). See also Sim-
mon v. Iowa Mut. Cas. Co., 3 Ill. 2d 318, 121 N.E.2d 509 (1954) (prejudice is not material
element, but is relevant to question of 'breach) ; cases collected in Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 443
(1951).
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